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 ii 
 
 
Abstract 
 
In modern western societies, and most other economies to which it has spread, 
territorial economic competition is associated with a combination of competitive 
electoral politics and private land-ownership. In mainland China, however, a very 
strong form of this competition has emerged without either of these supports. In 
general, the development of such local collective action and its particular effects 
reflect an interaction between materially interested local agents and structural 
pressures. The difference in China is that these agents are principally local 
government leaders whose career prospects within a still centralized system depend 
upon performance in terms of economic criteria set from above.  
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 1 
1.  Introduction  
 
Territorial competition is a term introduced originally to refer to a new phenomenon 
of city/region based competitive economic development policies noted in the early 
1990s in a Western European context (Gordon and Jayet 1994; Cheshire and Gordon 
1995). Its most striking feature there was an apparent reversal of the orientation of 
spatial economic policies, from nationally-based top-down ‘regional policies’, with a 
strong emphasis on spatial equity and political cohesion, toward a bottom-up focus, in 
which initiatives emerged from particular places, each pursuing their own economic 
interests. This shift was seen as particularly linked with the progress of trade 
liberalisation within the European Union, notably in relation to the ‘completion of the 
Single European Market (SEM)’, scheduled for 1992.   
 
In North America (particularly the United States) a rather similar phenomenon had a 
very much older history, in a context with no real experience of top-down spatial 
policy, except briefly and partially during the New Deal of the 1930s Depression 
years. There, a focus of state or city government on the promotion of local economic 
interests, in an unabashedly competitive fashion, was seen as entirely natural (as it 
had not been in Europe) and as representing one of the core obligations on elected 
officials. From this perspective, a version of territorial competition represented the 
continuation of private market processes ‘by other means’, effectively politicisation of 
spatial economic competition – rather than the injection of a competitive dimension 
into territorial management/spatial policy.  
 
The contrasts between these two cases are of as much interest as the apparent 
convergence between them if we want to understand how processes of territorial 
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 2 
competition are likely to operate in still other contexts.  One of the historic sources of 
difference appears to be the role of the ‘frontier’ in North American development 
right into the 20th century, with a large extensive margin to growth as new territories 
are opened up for exploitation, on a highly competitive basis. Typically this operated 
with minimal top-down regulation and with open conflict between territorially-based 
units over strategic infrastructural issues, such as rail routes and control over water 
resources. At a more institutional/ideological level, substantial differences remain 
between the two continents in prevailing assumptions about the principle of state 
intervention in the economy. Related to these are contrasts in the form and structuring 
of political competition, between a European model based on the development by 
national parties of ideologically distinct political programmes, and a North American 
model relying more on bottom-up (territorial) processes of support-building.   
 
Notwithstanding these important differences, there is of course a great deal in 
common between the two continents, most notably the combination of pluralistic 
political processes, buttressed by openly competitive elections, and an expectation 
that territorial development will be primarily driven by private business and property 
interests. This pair of conditions seems quite fundamental to the operation of 
territorial competition in these cases, and both seem to apply also in other less 
developed economies where active territorial competition has been reported, as in the 
Brazilian case examined by Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix (2001). The appearance of 
similar phenomena in China, where provincial and city governments are 
acknowledged to have played a key role in rapid recent growth marks a notable 
exception then. For, despite substantial liberalisation of external economic relations 
and a burgeoning domestic private sector, the country remains an authoritarian 
Communist society, in which neither of these conditions applies. This raises questions 
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 3 
about the generalisability of models of territorial competition initially developed for a 
western context and/or about what the Chinese case may reveal of missing elements 
in these models. 
 
In principle, the concept (at least) of territorial competition ought to be applicable to 
the Chinese case, since it is defined in essentially functional terms, relating to any 
class of activity undertaken by a territorially-based agency to advance a set of local 
economic interests. What kind of activity, which agencies, and also which specific 
interests, are all treated as endogenous variables requiring explanation - rather than as 
something to be taken for granted, as they are in more specific notions such as 
‘boosterism’ or ‘growth machines’. The practical question which we need to address 
here is whether the framework of explanation developed for western contexts can 
usefully be applied to make sense of the forms that territorial competition takes in 
China. This framework envisages particular forms of territorial competition as 
emerging out of the interaction between a set of structural factors (relating to 
competitive pressures in the economic environment) and the need for agency (with a 
collective action problem to be resolved somehow, and possible involvement of non-
local actors). The types of competition which may result have been characterised in 
terms of variable kinds of (more or less) local coalitions, of varying degrees of 
strength, involving different mixes of interests (in spatial and sectoral terms), and 
leading to particular biases in the policies pursued. The different characteristics of 
these policies are then partly reflected in a normative categorisation of them as purely 
wasteful, zero-sum or productive/capacity-building, with the last (only) of these 
potentially strengthening the bases for future coalition-building and effective 
competitive action (Cheshire and Gordon 1996, 1998). 
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 4 
In western contexts, whether in North America or Western Europe, a large part of 
actual territorially competitive activity fits into either the first or the second category, 
for understandable reasons, with little clear evidence of growth or productivity 
payoffs at the national scale. By contrast, in the Chinese case the prima facie evidence 
is that local initiatives and local adaptations of central policy have been a major 
instrument for the economy’s very rapid development over the past 25 years. One 
reason for the difference might be that we are not comparing like with like, and that 
these ‘local’ variations in China often relate to activity at the provincial and city levels 
(Shen 2005) - more comparable in scale with European nations than with the typical 
units involved in Western versions of territorial competition – while the more 
competitively successful prefectures/counties tend to be rather large cities. Another 
important reason relates to the fact that at a national scale Chinese economy remains 
rather rigid, with weakly developed markets and regional trade barriers, so that 
responsibility for stimulating innovation and a market-sensitive flexibility falls to sub-
national units, in a way not required in fully capitalist economies. How, and how far, 
these units have actually been able to fulfil this role, and the degree to which they 
have managed to avoid pursuit of the wasteful and zero-sum forms of territorial 
competition are among the important questions which need to be addressed about the 
evolving Chinese version of territorial competition. 
 
In this paper we attempt to place such questions in a comparative framework, by first 
outlining a general ‘theory’ of territorial competition, developed in relation to western 
experience (section 2), then discussing the kinds of contingent factors which have 
affected its actual development in ‘western’ contexts, within North America and 
Western Europe (section 3), before turning  to consider the Chinese case, in rather 
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 5 
more depth (section 4) and how we might compare the different versions of territorial 
competition (section 5).  
 
2.  General Theory of Territorial Competition 
 
The theory of territorial competition is concerned with trying to establish three things 
about the promotion, by agencies representing territorially-based economic interests, 
of significant policies to promote those interests competitively, vis-à-vis those of other 
territories. The first issue involves identifying the circumstances under which this is 
more likely to occur. The second involves explaining the mix of policies which are 
actually pursued, out of the very wide range which are in principle relevant to 
advancing these interests. This leads on to a third subject of interest, namely 
understanding the likely consequences for different interests inside and outside the 
territory of the selected policies, in a context of active competition across territories. 
Though emerging in a specific late 20th century European context, the theory is meant 
to generalise discussion of these issues, incorporating earlier analyses of North 
American variants (including boosterism, growth machines and urban regimes) as 
well as of distinctively European approaches within a broader framework, capable of 
extension to emergent practice in radically different contexts, such as that of China.  
 
As originally framed, the theory approached this issue from two directions, 
characterised in economic language as representing the demand and supply sides of a 
market for territorially competitive policies, or of the capacity to develop and pursue 
these. Since the ‘demand side’ actually represents a set of logically inferred functional 
requirements for such policies/capacity, given a set of structural features of the 
prevailing economic environment - in terms of technology, specialisation and market 
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 6 
structure – the distinction may as usefully be made in more sociological terms, as 
relating to interaction between structural and agency factors2. In either case, a basic 
premise is that the (changing) shape of territorial competition cannot be simply 
understood or predicted in terms of a functionalist economic argument focused on 
‘demand’ side or ‘structural’ factors where collective action is involved, since there is 
no guarantee as to the political responses of ‘agents’ to these pressures. There is 
actually an argument to be made for introducing a third dimension, in terms of 
legitimation processes (Gordon, forthcoming), but here we shall continue to focus on 
the demand/supply or structure/agency distinction, introducing legitimation questions 
in a more ad hoc fashion.  
 
In the economic policy arena, these two directions are reflected in the more specific 
perspectives of regulation and (urban) regime theory, with their roots respectively in 
macro-level economics/political economy3 and urban political science. While 
acknowledging the contradictory character of social relations, the regulationist logic 
works from the ‘needs’ of a particular regime of accumulation, to which micro-level 
behaviour has somehow to be fitted.  Within the context of a post-Fordist4 and 
increasingly competitive global economy, the emergence of new forms of sub-national 
economic management – in a sphere more traditionally controlled by central states - 
has been seen by various scholars in this tradition as a way of meeting such needs 
(Jessop, 1994; Brenner, 2003; Harvey, 19895).  The urban regime approach by 
contrast starts from the perspective of local political elites, the strategic choices which 
they face in terms of interest management / coalition-building, and the implications of 
these for feasible political programmes (Stone, 1989). From this perspective, the 
emergence of territorially competitive policies in particular places tends to be seen as 
a reflection of the configuration and resources of local interests of different kinds. The 
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 7 
leverage which local economic interests can exercise may, however, clearly be quite 
substantially altered by external structural factors – just as the way/degree to which 
structural ‘needs’ for such initiatives are actually met may be substantially dependent 
on micro-level institutional factors. And the actual force which the external factors 
exert on local elites in specific places, via ‘competitive pressures’, will depend in turn 
on how far their counterparts elsewhere have committed themselves to territorially 
competitive policies, as well as on the regulatory/fiscal strategies of national elites6. 
The rationale for comparative studies of the development of territorial competition in 
radically different contexts is then to understand rather more clearly how the two sets 
of explanatory factors interact, and the degree of contingency in its functioning.          
 
In the West European context, the structural/demand issue was originally addressed in 
terms of changes in the economic environment which could account for the 
emergence during the 1980s/1990s of a traditionally absent class of activity. This 
seems appropriate in the Chinese context too, where conspicuous developments have 
been at least as recent, and represent an even more striking reversal. But the structural 
argument has also to encompass the North American case, where recent changes seem 
much less radical7, with some forms of active territorial competition representing the 
historic norm. And we should also recognise earlier periods in Europe (if not China) 
where such activity was also more common than during much of the last century. The 
issue may thus be as much about the varying importance of factors which serve to 
repress bottom-up economic development policies, for which there is some continuing 
structural logic, as about those emergent factors which heighten their salience.  
 
At the simplest, most general level, a functional requirement for territorially-based 
development policies may be seen to stem from the combination of significant spatial 
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 8 
externalities affecting the success of specific enterprises – via shared infrastructure 
needs, common skill pools, and the diffusion of technologies and reputations – with 
benefits from subsidiarity, implying locally selected actions which can be tailored to 
varying circumstances. From this functionalist perspective then, the optimal 
distribution of  powers and responsibilities for different kinds of economically 
relevant policy becomes a matter of the scales over which currently relevant spatial 
externalities (both positive and negative) are most significant, and the relative 
economic salience of the kinds of local difference that justify local autonomy in 
policy-making. 
 
In practice, however, it is virtually impossible to use this structural approach to 
determine the actual distribution of roles, powers and responsibilities which ought to 
emerge, independently of thinking about agency factors and how these have evolved. 
A substantively important aspect which also illustrates the general point involves the 
issues of establishing areas of effectively free trade with the necessary shared 
measures, standards, rights and systems of contract enforcement, and with the 
physical means to secure these. Extending the areas over which these conditions are 
satisfied – first to encompass what are now recognised as nation states and now 
beyond this, through regional integration and global economic regulation – has been a 
continuing thread in capitalist economic development (Braudel 1982). But it is one 
which has always been politically contentious and dependent on a reconstruction of 
identities and affiliations (as with the development of European nationalisms), as well 
as recourses to physical force.    
 
Nevertheless, such structural arguments do have implications for the direction of 
evolution in territorial policies to be expected from particular changes in the economic 
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 9 
environment of a region. For example, it appears that traded service and artisanal 
activities have tended to be more sensitive to specific local characteristics and 
reputations (‘urban assets’) than have factory manufactures.  And, in any sector, 
standardisation of methods and products encourages a greater dependence on 
corporate assets than those which are place specific. Both deindustrialisation and post-
Fordism should then make greater demands on localised administrations to secure the 
conditions for their competitiveness – reversing a shift associated with the 
development of large scale manufacturing. There would, however, still remain many 
issues of economic management involving broader spatial externalities, for which 
national and supra-national interventions and regulation would be required.  
 
On the agency/supply side of the picture, the natural starting point is the existence of a 
range of self-interested parties with particularly strong stakes in territorial economic 
success. In Cox and Mair’s (1988) terms these are spatially dependent actors, whose 
economic success is directly linked to that of their local/regional economy, or some 
major segment of it. In economists’ language they are all rent-earners, with 
landowners as just the most conspicuous example of a group whose asset values vary 
with strength of demand for location in their territory.  For others the tie may be in 
terms of markets and/or local networks, where an individual or business has a 
privileged access to local opportunities (whether as monopolist or through past 
marketing efforts) which is not readily transferable elsewhere.  In principle this could 
cover (some) workers also, provided the local labour market for their skills was 
effectively closed to inward and outward movement, or they enjoyed an ‘insider’ 
status on the basis of personal reputation with local employers. It could also apply to a 
local authority – or its leaders, conceived of as agents in their own right - where its 
revenue-raising capacity was heavily dependent on the local tax base. On the same 
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 10 
grounds, existing local tax payers and service users could be seen to have a stake in an  
area’s success, though only if developments yielded a clear gain in net revenue to the 
authority.  This line of argument was developed originally in a US context, but has 
considerable potential for comparative analyses, since it starts to suggest how agency 
potential may be substantially affected by kinds of institutional and legal 
arrangements that vary between countries. 
 
However, the Cox/Mair argument identifies necessary rather than sufficient conditions 
for the emergence of active local support of competitive activity.  A familiar 
‘collective action’ problem (Olson 1965) means that individual actors may well not 
find it worth their while to expend resources to pursue their territorial interests on a 
collective basis – as distinct from simply investing to reinforce their personal stakes in 
the markets concerned.  It all depends on whether they believe that there would be any 
significant effect on outcomes as a result of their involvement. The point of Olson’s 
argument is, of course, not that such action is never pursued, but rather that it depends 
on arrangements that link participation to some private benefit – not just a share in the 
collective benefit - or exploit some non-instrumental source of solidarity. The simplest 
example is where a small group, with individually substantial stakes, can effectively 
contract with each other to participate actively, on condition of the others also 
similarly participating. By its nature this kind of arrangement seems to be  effectively 
available only to small groups – thus introducing a general bias into collective action.  
In some circumstances, however, a powerful lead actor may also be able to organise a 
system of selective benefits to commit a larger group to come on board some 
collective action, for which the ‘leader’ provides a substantial share of the resources. 
The potential to achieve this may again be heavily dependent on the institutional and 
legal setting. 
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But it will also depend on, and shape, the class of interests to be pursued, since 
collective action potential is greater where there are a few major stake-holders, with 
closely aligned interests, strong trust relations reproduced through the kind of routine 
interaction operating through well established networks/localities, and where there is 
more capacity to exclude outsiders from benefit. Where territorial competition has yet 
been routinised, such biases in the bases of achievable coalition can be expected to 
involve: tendencies both to conservatism (reproducing established sectoral 
specialisms) and localism; and to especially favour new physical development 
schemes offering an element of monopoly profits to a small group of direct 
stakeholders (notably site-owners and entrepreneurial developers). Another kind of 
predicted ‘bias’ is to inaction, or to more or less ‘symbolic’ action (Edelman 1970) in 
cases where a weakly organised group, whose interests conflict with those of others, 
and which cannot police the actual outcomes of a policy, can be at least temporarily 
sated by a gesture suggestive of more substantial action (Cheshire and Gordon 1996). 
 
We should also acknowledge a kind of ‘counter-agency’ issue, in the sense of rival 
kinds of organisation, of other interests at other spatial scales. These may include both 
more local coalitions of environmental protectionists (NIMBYists) and less local 
(national or supra-national) groupings pursuing more generic, sectoral or class-based 
interests. The significant point about these is not simply that different concerns may 
have naturally distinct spatial ranges but that, since any organisation which is actually 
achieved represents a valuable political asset for its members and the interests it 
represents, they are liable to resist any threats to its value from transfers of relevant 
power and responsibility to other spatial scales.     
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All territorially competitive activity has uneven effects: spatially, sectorally and also 
in terms of specific beneficiaries. The logic of collective (in)action exaggerates this 
tendency, since this is what motivates agents to expend resources in pursuing it, and 
since it can only effectively be organised for particular, biased sets of interests. Hence 
such activity is very likely to be redistributive, within a territory as well as across 
territories, even though it is legitimated as producing collective gains, and even 
though the structural arguments point to the potential for achieving such gains. This 
point has been forcefully made by Krugman (1996) who - in relation to action at both 
a national and a city scale - argues that, while the existence of strong returns to scale 
provides an intellectually respectable basis for interventionist policies to promote 
competitiveness, in practice the vast majority of cases actually made lack such 
respectability, instead representing disguised efforts to pursue specific vested 
interests, at the cost of all others.  
 
From a social perspective, a distinction may be made then between three categories of 
territorially competitive policy: the purely wasteful, involving expenditure of some 
kind without any significant gains; those producing a (more or less) zero-sum balance 
of costs and gains, accruing to different groups; and those producing positive net 
additions to welfare, typically through enhancing productive capacities in some way 
(Cheshire and Gordon 1998). The distinction between these can be a slightly 
arbitrary: for example, the purely wasteful category does normally involve gains to 
some actors, even if only the policy-makers themselves, though substantially out-
weighed by the costs involved; whether policies are seen as zero-sum or not can 
depend on how widely drawn are the boundaries within which consequences are 
considered (e.g. nationally or globally); and many ‘zero-sum’ policies might more 
properly be seen as negative sum, when the costs of running them are taken into 
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account.  However, it is a heuristically useful distinction, since the ‘symbolic’ policies 
pursued in the absence of strong support for effective collective action are particularly 
likely to represent pure waste, while biases in coalition formation favouring policies 
with exclusive benefits for (local) insiders typically mean losses for others, and near 
zero-sum outcomes. In particular, the absence of a strong governmental body capable 
of fulfilling a leadership role for such coalitions at something like the scale of a 
functional urban region is liable to encourage policies diverting economic activity 
from adjoining regions, possibly through direct movement, but more likely through 
‘poaching’ part of their market, or bidding against them for potential inward 
investment (Cheshire and Gordon 1998).   
 
More specifically, it has been argued that collective action problems lead to a bias in 
favour of policies to attract such inward investment, beyond what is economically 
appropriate. A starting point is that competition with other similar areas for such 
inward investment is a zero-sum activity. Beyond this, however, it is argued that, 
when this competition proceeds through the offer of locational subsidies (or other 
such generalised incentives), mobile capital is able to exploit the process by playing 
off areas against each other – engendering incentive tournaments (Mytelka, 2002) - so 
that the ‘successful’ bidder ends up incurring costs just about equal to the benefits it 
expects to receive8 (Wins 1995; Cheshire and Gordon 1998). In this case the process 
becomes not simply zero-sum – with places that worked harder and more effectively 
expecting to win out at the cost of those which did not – but one with near zero net 
gains for all participants, except for owners of the mobile activities (cf. Rodriguez-
Pose and Arbix 2001). The balance of power here depends in part on the degree of 
fragmentation of territorially competitive units, and the degree to which their bidding 
is constrained by some higher level of government, but it also depends on how far 
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 14 
each is offering an effectively identical set of assets/attractors, and competing for the 
same targets. Where there are no constraints and many areas compete on the same 
basis, a ‘race to the bottom’ is particularly likely.  
 
To attain some countervailing power and avoid this outcome, territories would need to 
identify and cultivate distinctive kinds of asset, incentive and specialism (Malecki, 
2004). With a weak capacity for development of broadly-based strategies of territorial 
competition, however, areas are particularly liable to engage in extensive mimicry of 
each others initiatives (cf. Harvey, 1989), grounded both in beliefs that they are 
offering what inward investors in general most want, and in what are perceived to be 
effective symbols of serious competitive activity (Cheshire and Gordon 1998). A 
further, more contingent, argument is that it is not in fact disparities in rates of inward 
investment (in either gross or net terms) that make the real difference between more 
and less successful territories, but rather  the growth performance of already 
established businesses (whether originally indigenous, or earlier in-movers).  How 
literally this observation applies outside the western context from which it originated 
may be questionable, though Rodriguez-Pose and Arbix (2001) show that local gains 
from inward investment can be very limited even in an LDC context. A lot obviously 
depends on how much genuinely indigenous business capacity there is to work with.  
But the thrust of the argument is clearly a sound one, in contrasting the (quite general) 
need to build distinctive local strengths which encourage the embedding of inward 
movers as well as promoting the competitive strength of all local firms, with the 
(specific) biases in policy expected where independent leadership is weak, 
competitive activities are unconstrained, and the political bases for collective action 
are highly selective coalitions of interests. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
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 15 
 
This outline of a general model of territorial competition – the key features of which 
are summarised in Figure 1 – is intentionally both simplified and somewhat abstract, 
since its purpose is to frame a comparative analysis.  For this reason, we have avoided 
close engagement either with the empirical literature or with overlapping sets of 
theoretical argument, in the interests of developing a clearer line of argument to 
highlight contextual factors which might generate significantly different versions of 
territorial competition (or non-competition) in different situations. At the same time,  
the model itself has clearly been framed against the background of western 
experience, and is rooted in a pluralistic version of political economy, which may or 
may not translate well to the context of post-Mao China, with its peculiar combination 
of communist politics and capitalist economics. Before directly addressing that 
question (in section 4), however, we should first consider how the model ‘plays’ on its 
home ground, in relation to what have been quite variable western experiences of 
territorial competition.    
 
3.  Significant Features of Western Experience 
 
The development of territorial competition in North America and in Western Europe 
has proceeded in quite separate ways, shaped by different institutional factors, over 
very different time scales.  In the North American case – predominantly in the United 
States – key factors have included the history of settlement, reflected in federal 
constitutions, and the related development of more commercial organisations with 
localised monopoly power, as well as the absence of an ideologically-grounded 
national party politics. These have meant that there are very few constraints on the 
pursuit of state or local economic development policies, and a strong representation of 
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locally dependent economic interests in Cox and Mair’s (1988) sense. In particular, 
normal banks were (until the 1990s) legally constrained from operating across state 
borders, while the main ‘public’ utilities were supplied by private, territorialised 
organisations, who (with local media) provided core stakeholder members for local 
economic development coalitions. Also, crucially, sub-national governments have 
been almost totally dependent on a local tax base for their resources – while 
politicians have also largely depended on locally mobilised resources for campaign 
funding in elections to public office. The relative ease of incorporating new local 
government units at the frontier of development around urban regions is also a 
relevant factor. 
 
Together these represent some of the most favourable circumstances imaginable for 
development of an active politics of territorial competition, with some ties into 
generalised local economic interests.  However, it is also clear that the local coalitions 
which emerge as driving forces for competitive policies have tended to represent a 
more particular combination of interests. As Stone (1989; 1993) has argued, urban 
political leaders have some choice over the kind of regime they construct – in the 
sense of the coalition of interests with which they align themselves – though some of 
these offer an easier and more reliable base for political success than others. In 
particular, versions of the Molotch (1976) ‘growth machine’, in which a small set of 
actors with physical development interests lead the dominant coalition, has been a 
very common model, with very long historic roots.   
 
In Western Europe, by contrast, with a history of urbanisation predating democratic 
politics, mostly unitary national states, ideologically-based national politics, and 
utilities which have more commonly been in public ownership, territorial competition 
Page 18 of 57
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Accepted version January 2007 
 17 
has been more of the exception than the rule. Indeed in the 20th century, active 
economic intervention and fiscal management were more or less monopolised by 
central governments, greatly restricting the capacity of local government to act 
autonomously. Moreover nation states generally assumed responsibility for a 
substantial degree of territorial justice in access to public services, in the interests of 
political cohesion, greatly weakening the link between their supply and the local tax 
base.  
 
In this context, the major stimuli to development of territorial competition seem to 
have been the combination of: weak central government responses to large scale 
industrial job losses starting in the early 1980s; and accelerating internationalisation, 
particularly via European economic integration. Of these European integration was 
arguably much the more significant factor, since it affected more places with potential 
competitive resources, and because it shifted the attitudes of central government 
toward locally-based economic initiatives. From this perspective, the key 
developments in European integration were those affecting competition in urbanised 
services, particularly associated with the SEM’s removal of non-tariff barriers to trade 
in services. This promised an end to the effective monopoly in provision of high-order 
services enjoyed by each of the leading national centres – making their promotion 
much less of a zero-sum game as far as national governments were concerned – and 
the possibility for second-order cities (as well as potential European capitals) to 
develop trans-national hinterlands. One interpretation of this development was that it 
was opening the way, in economic terms, to a United States of Europe.  Beyond the 
suggestion of possible convergence with the US in territorial competitive practices, 
creation of the SEM also meant that there was a single space within which external 
investors wanting to penetrate the European market could choose to locate.             
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In this new context (reinforced by the steadier shift to a post-industrial economy), 
interest in local economic development and competitive strategies has burgeoned right 
across Europe, reinforced by ideas from Porter (1990) about the significance of 
territorial industrial clusters for competitive advantage. However, it is far from clear 
that the reality has yet matched the rhetoric, with a proliferation of marketing 
initiatives that often appear to represent symbolic politics rather than commitments of 
resources likely to engender substantial growth. And there are only limited signs of 
American style growth machine politics (or even urban regimes) taking over in 
Europe (Wood 1996; Harding 1999) 
 
In fact, a striking feature of the European interest in versions of territorial competition 
has been the variety of models that have been pursued in different areas, and imitated 
elsewhere.  In places such as Paris, Lille, Lyon, London, Emilia Romagna, and 
Barcelona these have variously emphasised strategic regional planning, international 
transport links, industrial planning, SME support and collaboration, and flagship 
projects – though there has also been widespread imitation of, for example, US 
waterfront re-development schemes.  A notable feature of these high profile 
examples, however, has been the particularity of the political conditions on which 
they seem to have been grounded, including party-political projects of broader 
significance, ethnic solidarity, and the ambitions of a nation-state for its urban 
standard-bearer (Gordon 1999). How far any of them can be reproduced in areas 
without these special conditions is unclear, though in a range of European contexts 
either the nation state or the European Union provides an element of potential 
leadership via competitive support schemes for (mostly) capacity-enhancing policies. 
Conversely, EU competition policy rules out the more direct forms of price 
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 19 
competition for mobile investment deployed in the US ‘economic war among the 
states’ (Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 1996).  
 
It is very hard to assess the extent to which territorially competitive strategies of one 
kind or another have had a significant impact on growth performance, particularly 
when the issue is not one of boosterist effort/successes but more of the judiciousness 
of a wide range of relevant actions. However, there is one piece of credible evidence 
in the European context suggesting that they could make a significant difference.  
This comes from an analysis by Cheshire and Magrini (2002) of per capita GDP 
growth performance across the Functional Urban Regions (FURs) of the EU, with 
results showing – in accord with the theory sketched above – that (after control for 
many other influences) there is a very significant tendency for stronger performance 
in cases with governmental units close in scale to the FUR. Since the logic is that 
better policies will be generated in such cases (where localist bias is weakened), the 
implication of the evidence is that territorial policies can have a significant effect, for 
better or for worse.     
 
4.  Territorial Competition in China 
 
Territorial competition only really emerged in China after Mao’s death, but then 
developed rapidly, with a close link to the growing dynamism of the national 
economy.  In Mao’s time, any such competition was more or less confined to the 
fictional realm, with provincial growth data being ‘cooked up’ to fit unrealistic targets 
during the era of strong central planning. Though in the 1960s and 1970s there was an 
official policy of self-reliant local economic development, state investment (focused 
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on military priorities) was dictated from the centre, and with hostility to FDI, there 
was very little scope for pursuit of competitively-oriented policies.  
 
Since then, however, regions, provinces, and cities have all striven to accrue the 
greatest amount of resources, bargaining for the most favourable policy concessions 
and seeking to generate the highest growth rates (Qian and Xu 1993a; 1993b; 
Montinola, Qian et al. 1995; Yang 1997; Gore 1999; Yeung 2000). One visible 
symbol has been the inclusion of comparative tables of economic performance 
relative to neighbouring jurisdictions in many provincial and municipal yearbooks. 
This competition has focused very heavily on inward investment - via both 
importation of state-of-the-art production lines and growth-enhancing infrastructure 
projects - rather than promotion of competitive advantage for local firms. Thus, by 
mid-2003 there were more than 5,000 development zones across China – two thirds of 
them developed independently by sub-provincial authotities9 all bidding for FDI 
principally through preferential tax rebates.10 Similarly there has been a proliferation 
of new international airports, with 5 now in the Pearl River Delta alone (including the 
two in Hong King and Macao) and a similar number in the Yangtze delta (the latest 
virtually unused)11.  
 
This competition has arisen in radically different circumstances than in either Europe 
or North America, both politically and economically: with an absence of democracy 
and with strong Party control remaining, despite substantial economic liberalisation; 
and with new barriers to inter-provincial trade emerging, despite much greater 
openness to foreign trade and capital flows. In order to understand how territorial 
competition operates in this environment, we shall again look at issues of structural 
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change and of agency, before focusing on some key features of the Chinese version of 
territorial competition and their consequences.  
 
4-1  Structural influences  
As in Europe, shifting competitive pressures and closer integration into an 
international economy were key structural influences on the growth of territorial 
competition in China, though both worked quite differently in the Chinese context 
(Wu, 2003b).  Thus, whereas in Europe the shift towards a more flexible, post-Fordist, 
post-industrial economy, with a greater emphasis on quality competition was an 
important factor, the Chinese context was of industrialisation, price competition and 
an emergent kind of Fordism. Indeed such (unmatchable) price-based competition 
from newly industrialising countries had encouraged the switch toward ‘quality’ in the 
west (Wu 2003a; Wu and Ma 2005).  Also, whereas in Europe the most relevant 
internationalisation was creation of the SEM, on a scale to match to the United States 
domestic market, the closest equivalent in the Chinese case – its own national market 
– was getting increasingly fragmented, with new trade barriers being created, as a 
defence against predatory competition in circumstances of structural industrial 
overproduction and/or resource shortage.12 To a much greater extent than in the west 
then, active competition between Chinese cities and regions (as opposed to this 
defensive competition) would be in relation to their shares of external trade and 
capital flows.  
 
On the other hand, there was at least one parallel in the direction of change, with both 
the transition to post-Maoism in the Chinese economy and to post-Fordism in the 
west, requiring a much closer engagement with dynamic market processes, for policy-
makers as well as businessmen. Both this and the greater mobility of capital placed 
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increasing responsibility on regional authorities to ensure the availability and quality 
of local-bound complementary assets to attract, retain and anchor the right kind of 
mobile investment (Agnew 2000; Dunning 2000) 
 
The radical impact of the opening-up of the Chinese economy from 1978 is indicated 
in Table 1, which shows the volume of trade increasing 30-fold over 24 years, with its 
share of a rapidly growing GDP up by a factor of 6 – while from next to nothing 
annual flows of FDI grew to around 5% of GDP (Table 1). By 2003, China had 
became the biggest receiver of FDI in the world, and the 3rd or 4th largest trading 
economy.   
  
[Table 1 about here]  
 
At the same time, however, inter-provincial trade was at best stagnating in absolute 
terms - and falling sharply as a proportion of sales or GDP (Kumar 1994; Poncet 
2003; 2005). This reflected both the rapid growth of foreign trade, and a tendency for 
domestic trade to become more heavily concentrated within provinces, as a result of 
growing protectionism.  
 
The other major structural shift relevant to the growth of territorial competition in 
China was the broader transition process from socialist central planning toward a 
more liberal, market-based economy, involving price and land-use reform as well as 
the open-door policy. During the 1980s, there was a shift from a pure system of plan-
based prices, to a ‘dual track’ (where additional output could be sold at market prices) 
and then complete market determination (Shirk 1992). And, at the end of the decade, 
a constitutional amendment extended the market mechanism to use rights in land, 
though not actual ownership (Yeh and Wu 1999; Yeh 2005).  
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These radical economic developments clearly reflected national policy, but coexisted 
with a determination to keep political control firmly in the hands of Beijing and the 
Communist Party, and concern that economic changes should not threaten this. This 
represented a quite distinct (almost uniquely Chinese) reason for allowing territorial 
variations in economic development initiatives, to explore routes to change without 
seriously endangering national stability if they should get out of control.13 Famously 
Deng had given the instruction in the late 1970s to ‘let some people (and regions) get 
rich first’. This could be seen not only as replacing the notion of ‘equal poverty’ with 
a ‘ladder-step’ approach to spatial policy (ti du li lun), giving explicit priority to 
investment in coastal regions with greater development potential (Lu 2004), but also 
as implying a more flexible approach to policy in some particular provinces (as 
initially in Guangdong).  
 
Certainly studies show that the economic transition towards market economy has 
largely been propelled by active local city and regional governments, pioneering new 
policies with varying degrees of national endorsement or tolerance (Goodman 1994; 
Yang 1994; Chung 1999; 2000; Yeung 2000). One type of case is represented by the 
initial development of Special Economic Zones in Guangdong and Fujian provinces, 
from a prototype in Shekou approved by central government (in 1979) on a joint 
proposal from Guangdong provincial government and a Hong Kong-based company 
(Zhu 2005). Another is represented by Guangdong’s successful introduction in the 
early 1980s, without any permission from Beijing, of a new kind of joint venture with 
foreign investors, using existing properties as assets (Zhang 1994). Examples 
elsewhere include the privatisation or down-sizing of state-owned enterprises , both 
also introduced and proved as successful locally, prior to adoption of any national 
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policy (Montinola, Qian et al. 1995; Cao, Qian et al. 1999). Without formal loosening 
of controls, a notable feature of China’s transition in the post-Mao period was that 
innovative economic policies could, and did, get initiated from the local level rather 
than by the centre. 
 
There are some parallels between this experience and the emergence of more active 
economic roles for sub-national units in western societies, with both reflecting moves 
away from more rigid national approaches in the face of pressures from 
internationalisation (Wu 2003a; Wu and Ma 2005). Some effective devolution was 
also evident in other development and transition countries, with Dillinger (1994) 
reporting that 63 out of the 75 larger states claimed to be transferring some power to 
sub-national units, while Rodriguez-Pose and Gill (2003) confirmed this for former 
USSR, Yugoslavia and Eritrea among the transition countries.  
 
Within China there was a series of formal acts of administrative and fiscal 
decentralisation. Central controls were reduced over many aspects of economic 
activity, including investment, land use, banking and management of public-owned 
companies. The range of investments requiring approval by the State Planning 
Committee was significantly reduced, and sub-national governments were granted 
much responsibility for managing trade and FDI activities, exemplified by an increase 
in the size of joint venture applications that provinces could deal with from US$ 3 
million in 1983 to US$ 10 million in 1985 and then to US$ 30 million for certain 
coastal provinces in 1988 (Zhang 1994; Huang 1996). Land use control was also 
decentralised, allowing sub-national governments to transfer very large areas of land 
to their new development zones, whose total area exceeded that of centrally planned 
sites. With introduction of a market in land-use rights, an unintended consequence 
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was for several authorities to effectively become property speculators (Cartier 2001). 
In addition, more state-owned enterprises were handed over to sub-national 
authorities, with just 20% of their output remaining under central government control 
by 1985 (Montinola, Qian et al. 1995). At township and village level local officials 
became de facto owners, acting just like entrepreneurs of local profit-seeking 
companies (Oi 1995; Walder 1995; Oi 1998; Edin 2000).  
 
There was also substantial fiscal decentralisation, with central government’s share of 
public expenditure falling from around 53% to 30% between 1982 and 1998 
(Rodriguez-Pose and Gill 2003). In part this was because sub-national governments 
gained new taxes on industrial and commercial land use/appreciation (Yeh and Wu 
1999; Lin 2001). But it also reflected a substantial growth in self-raised revenues, 
some authorised by central government, but others not (Bahl 1999; Zhang 1999; 
Wong and Bhattasali 2003; Herrmann-Pillath and Feng 2004). Growth in the size and 
complexity of the latter category – the ‘extrabudgetary revenue’ and ‘extra-
extrabudgetary revenue’ - involved a de facto decentralisation of resources from 
which a variety of local economic initiatives could be funded (Brean 1998).  
 
In relation to the development of territorial competition in China, the salient structural 
fact was neither simply that State Council in Beijing and the Party clung on to their 
political authority, nor that internationalisation required a devolution of economic 
functions to a level where they could be exercised more flexibly. Rather it was that, in 
the absence of a formal constitutional position for sub-national authorities in the 
People’s Republic, operational relations between them and the centre evolved 
dynamically. Thus, at one point in time the centre might decentralise administrative 
powers so as to stimulate local enthusiasm for those of its policies reliant on local 
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initiatives; but then it might launch a political campaign to recentralise the powers to 
rectify local discretions. The leeway left by this non-constitutional system of relations 
meant that sub-national authorities adopted varying strategies to cope with the centre, 
while it, in turn, pursued different regulatory approaches and policies for particular 
provinces (Cheung 1994a; 1994b; Cheung 1998).  
 
4-2  Agents and motivations  
Given these evolving structural conditions, involving both a functional case for sub-
national development activities and weaker constraints on these, the question remains, 
as in the west: who, if anyone, has adequate motives and capacity to take on a role 
requiring both innovation and commitment. In one respect, the role might seem 
somewhat easier in post-Mao China, since all authorities have been committed to 
economic growth, and any potential anti-development groups are in their infancy, 
suggesting a natural local government–enterprise coalition (Zhu 1999). On the other 
hand, there is an uncertainty to be overcome about the limits to autonomy, in a 
context where central government does not have a united or consistent view about the 
speed of economic reform or the acceptable degree of devolution. 
 
The continuing dominance of the Chinese Communist Party is key to the agency issue 
in this context. The Party is still very much dominant over administration (the 
governments), parliament (the people’s congress), and jurisdiction (courts): as a 
Chinese saying goes ‘party overrides law (dan da yu fa)’ (Potter 1999; Guo 2000). 
This has both general implications for the politics of sub-national economic 
governance, and particular ones for who the key actors are with the motive and 
capacity to push territorially competitive policies forward. 
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To take the general aspect first, there are four basic points which need to be 
understood. The first is that a large part of the regulatory framework still consists of 
an array of party ‘documentations’ (wen jian) of various kinds – so-called reasons, 
directions, principles, solutions, plans, decisions, announcements, projects, details, 
opinions etc. – as well as government regulations, and actual ‘laws’. This 
‘documentary politics’ plays an important role in building consensus, formalizing 
personal preferences, and gaining ideological legitimacy (Wu 1995). The second is 
that without agreement and consensus from local party secretaries, sub-national 
officials (namely, governors or majors and so on) may not have final say over policies 
or their implementation  A local elite of cadres under party control occupy multiple 
roles as rule makers, enforcers, referees and players (Sachs, Woo et al. 2000), 
producing a distinctive kind of ‘local state corporatism’ at village/township level in 
particular and subnational levels in general, with officials often also de facto owners 
of key local enterprises, directly controlling investment, staffing and even sharing in 
profits - corresponding public-owned enterprises (Oi 1995; 1998). Ambiguities of this 
sort produce a kind of local ‘public-private coalition, Chinese style’.  However, 
thirdly, the effects of such ambiguity over property rights bear less heavily on firms 
(who report more confidence in the regulatory system than in other NICs)14 than on 
domestic landowners/farmers, whose land may easily be taken over for ‘public use’ 
with minimal compensation (Zhang 2006). Finally, despite economic liberalisation, 
relations between state/official and society/businesspersons/ professional consultants 
remain asymmetric in political terms (Zhu 1999; Zhang 2002). The state has 
legitimated external interests in an attempt to unleash the economic dynamism of 
societal groups, but in a way that directs that power toward its own goals. As He and 
Wu (2005) show for a major Shanghai scheme, key private investors can still have 
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negligible influence over the direction and pace of development, because of the public 
sector’s control of policy, financial leverage, and land leasing.  
 
The more specific influence of the Party over the emergence of active territorial 
competition comes through its continuing control over the nomenclature system of 
appointment to all leading positions. Top officials and cadres of sub-national 
governments are not elected locally but appointed or removed by upper level 
governments, on the basis of a quite systematic screening of candidates’ credentials, 
among which, since the early 1980s increasing weight has been given to objective 
assessments of concrete economic achievements, rather than subjective evaluations of 
political attitudes and work styles (Edin 2000; Whiting 2001; Edin 2003). 
Performance-based personnel management served to trigger careerism as - political 
incentives for local leaders to pursue stronger economic development. The more 
growth, the better the chances to get advancement, with increasing power and other 
rewards. The significance of this relationship has been confirmed empirically by Li 
and Zhou (2005) who showed that provincial officials were more likely to retain their 
job when economic growth rates improved during their tenure, and by Bo (2000) who 
showed that promotion of provincial leaders was related to stronger growth records 
(as reflected in contributions to central revenues) rather than either elite factionalism 
or localism. This could be the case even when local officials had departed radically 
from central policy lines, as Tan (2002) showed with a comparative study of the 
career paths of leaders from Jiangxi and Fujian, with the latter being rewarded for a 
successful exercise of discretion, in conflict with central austerity programs of the 
early 1990s. Political conformity, which was the only important promotion criterion 
in pre-reform days has now clearly given way to assessments of competence, 
particular in terms local economic performance as represented by some standard local 
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growth measures. In agency terms, the main driving force for territorial competition in 
the contemporary Chinese case thus seems to be the personal ambition of local 
officials, pursuing broad growth goals set by central government – rather than the 
particularist demands of local private interests as in the west. Their strategies may, 
however, depart significantly from current government orthodoxies – and have 
consequences that can also  be negative for other areas.  
  
4-3  The functioning and consequences of territorial competition 
Territorial competition emerged in post-Mao China, in the context of a strong push for 
national economic development, pursued via an asymmetric process of 
decentralisation (Chien, forthcoming) - allowing substantial economic autonomy to 
sub-national units, while maintaining a centralised system of political control – and 
with acceptance that some regions would grow faster than others. This opened the 
way for personally ambitious officials in provinces and cities to adopt innovative 
strategies both for promoting local growth and for mobilising the resources required 
for this purpose (Figure 2).. With narrowly defined economic goals, little constraint 
on external effects, and often ambiguous positions in relation to the public/private 
divide, sub-national administrations could take on many of the characteristics of 
North American growth machines, albeit in a quite different context.   
[Figure 2 about here] 
Perhaps the most salient of these differences – more than the fact that the process was 
driven neither by elected politicians nor private business-people – was the lack of 
effective integration of the Chinese national economy. Sub-national protectionism 
appears to have risen steadily during the reform era15, as a direct consequence of the 
increased fiscal and economic responsibilities accorded to provincial authorities. The 
driving factor appears to be a desire to mitigate the impacts on social stability and 
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local tax bases of liberalisation and privatisation programmes, particularly in those 
internal regions where economic reform and restructuring have made less progress 
(Poncet 2005). As Zhao and Zhang (1999) put it:  
 
‘Fiscal decentralisation has created conditions that encourage regionalism: 
disappearance of the traditional umbrella, unfairness to the poor regions, 
territorial segmentation and confrontation, central-local vertical confrontation, 
and failure of spatial programs of specialisation and co-operation’. 
 
A particular consequence has been to restrict the ability of Chinese private firms to 
exploit the scale of the national market in order to build competitiveness, as North 
American and (increasingly) European firms are able to do in their home markets. 
Indeed, rather perversely, foreign companies can be in a better position than home 
firms to operate across provincial boundaries. This may be accomplished indirectly, 
as in the case described by Huang (Huang 2003) where a small company from Hong 
Kong managed to acquire 200 firms across nine provinces, whereas the largest 
automotive firm in China could only operate in its home province. Or, for 
intermediate products, firms which are not based in an export processing zone have to 
sell in others via the so-called ‘Hong Kong day trip’. As far as sub-national economic 
development policies are concerned, such trade barriers both reduce the incentive to 
work on building competitiveness among local businesses, and focus attention on 
foreign firms as the single source of inward investment, while leaving these firms 
with great negotiating power, since they do have the choice of locating elsewhere.    
 
Another distinctive feature of the Chinese situation has been uneven imposition of 
central controls on sub-national authorities’economic activities. One example is in 
relation to the nominal limits set by central government during the 1980s and 1990s 
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on attraction of FDI. In the cases of Guangdong and Shanghai, however, Li (1997) 
has shown for years between the mid-1980s and early 1990s that the actual 
investment rates were consistently well above the national average, by a margin of 
about 50% in the Shanghai case and over 100% for Guangdong. Such discrepancies 
partly reflect the fact that local officials are actually in the front line as implementers 
of the central policy which gives them a certain power, at the margin at least. But the 
fact that systematic overshoots continued, especially in Guangdong, in a state 
retaining strong formal centralisation, points to a degree of selective indulgence of 
provinces successfully pushing the development programme forward. 
 
Of more fundamental importance, since competition for inward investment depends 
on the capacity to fund appropriate infrastructure investment, is the creativity which 
sub-national authorities have applied to mobilising additional sources of finance 
beyond those formally conferred by the centre.  In Shanghai, Zhang (2003) reports the 
use of a series of novel channels, including as well as budgetary revenues, land 
leasing, funds from the stock market, state-directed credit allocation, and foreign 
direct investments. In another case, Gujiao in Shanxi province, Herrmann-Pillath and 
Feng (2004) find infrastructure being financed partly through bargaining with upper-
tier authorities for a greater share of revenue, but also more innovatively, with 
‘reverse Build-Operate-Transfer contracts’, privatisation of public services, 
government enterprise, sale of land use rights and public-private partnership.   
Various innovative decision-making bodies have also been established in some places 
in order to legitimate expenditure on public projects, such as creation of a financial 
committee of the local People’s Congress, or a Board of Directors for Public Projects, 
comprising an selected group of the local elite (Fan 1998). 
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Despite a common system of career incentives, the actual roles assumed by Chinese 
sub-national officials in relation to economic development have varied greatly. A 
useful taxonomy proposed by Baum and Shevchenko (1999) identifies four such 
roles, on the basis of two criteria: whether or not officials were motivated to promote 
local economic growth; and whether or not they had a direct stake in the economic 
performance of local enterprises. Among the cases involving a positive commitment 
to local development they make a distinction between ‘entrepreneurial’ authorities, 
effectively operating as businesses, and ‘developmental’ authorities operating in a 
more detached way. But they also identify two sets of cases where officials engage in 
economically significant actions, without any serious economic development motive. 
The first of these is ‘clientelist’, where officials use their power, and freedom of 
independent checks, to pursue personal business interests in ways that do not 
contribute to local economic development. And finally, there are ‘predatory’ 
authorities, who use this power to exact illegal revenues from an overburdened 
peasantry or investors, as a means of reducing the fiscal gap, substituting for 
development to raise the local tax base. In these cases, career incentives appear 
inadequate to stimulate the kind of territorially competitive activity to which both 
structural change and central policy are pushing – in part maybe because local 
prospects are less good in the areas concerned. 
 
Unregulated territorial competition can have particularly negative consequences in a 
society where there is neither a pluralistic local politics nor effectively integrated 
markets. On a local scale, where policy is driven by a simple growth objective 
(whether in terms of GDP or contributions to central funds) there are obvious dangers 
that a large part of the population may suffer as a result of environmental degradation 
and/or the funding requirements for developmental investment. Taking a wider view, 
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neglect of spatial externalities in growth promotion and project development has 
several unintended negative consequences. One is duplicate investment which has 
exacerbated the scale of overproduction in a number of manufacturing activities, 
(Cannon and Zhang 1996), with levels of redundancy of 40%-75% being reported for 
textile and electronics products in the 1996 industrial census. Oversupply sometimes 
leads to price war, as in the auto industry (Lu 2004) and more generally has been a 
contributory factor in the imposition of more internal trade barriers. Another effect, 
attributable to the combination of unregulated territorial competition and market 
fragmentation, is the ‘miniaturisation of investment projects’, which has carried over 
from the pre-reform self-sufficiency policy, and means that many investment project 
are of sub-optimal size, particularly in relation to the scale of the Chinese economy 
(Gore 1999; Tang 2002). For example, with a total output of motor vehicles 
comparable with that of a single leading Japanese manufacturers, China actually had 
over 120 producers in 1995, with its top three firms only taking a third of the market 
(Huang 2001). Similar arguments apply to the proliferation of international airports 
within particular regions (referred to in section 1).  
 
This phenomenon reflects a strong tendency by almost all regions to try to compete on 
the same terms and with the same kind of projects, contrary to the principle of 
distinctiveness (discussed in section 2). This tendency to ‘isomorphism’ (or copy-
catting) is evident in industrial terms, both in relation to plans – with 19 of 30 
provinces identifying the auto industry as a priority for 1996-2000 national plan (Lu 
and Xue 1997)16 – and outcomes - with a high and increasing level of similarity in 
industrial structures, even as between the broad groups of coastal, central and western 
provinces (Gore 1999). A similar phenomenon is evident in relation to the types of 
competitive strategy pursued by sub-national authorities, as in the case of the 
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‘development zone fever’ (kai fa qu re) which spread across China, in imitation of the 
original Guangdong and Fujian province SEZs (Yeh and Wu 1999; Cartier 2001; 
Demurger, Sachs et al. 2001; Chien 2005). With a focus on price competition via a 
standardised mix of financial incentives, inward investors should be able to extract a 
very large part of the potential gains from such projects, without any longer term 
commitment to integration in the local economy.  
  
 
5.  Conclusion: Territorial Competition, Chinese Style  
 
Over the past 25 years a very strong form of territorial competition has emerged in 
China, where it has played an important role in the nation’s rapid development, 
particularly in relation to the attraction and accommodation of foreign direct 
investment. Though this might seem to represent an element of convergence with 
western development patterns, consistent with the process of market liberalisation 
underway in the country, the form taken by territorial competition in China has been 
very different from any observed in the west. Two key characteristics have been: the 
extent to which bottom-up, and somewhat autonomous, economic development 
initiatives have been driven at a macro-level by central government economic strategy 
(cf. Wu, 2003b); and at micro-level by the personal ambitions of public officials, 
whose promotion prospects depend on local growth performance. Both reflect the 
asymmetric character of rescaling in the Chinese governmental structure, with some 
real devolution of economic and fiscal responsibilities being accompanied by a firm 
insistence on the centralisation of political control in Beijing and in the Communist 
Party apparatus. The pattern of outcomes – including a systematic neglect of the 
negative side effects of growth and the limitations of a copy-catting approach to 
Page 36 of 57
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/cres Email: regional.studies@fm.ru.nl
Regional Studies
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review Only
Accepted version January 2007 
 35 
projects and inward investment – do, however, seem to have much in common with 
those identified with western (or more specifically North American) growth 
coalitions. This is somewhat ironic, given that the American coalitions are genuinely 
independent local entities, and include two key groups of members who are absent 
from their Chinese counterparts, namely elected politicians and private real estate 
interests.  
 
This irony signifies neither that territorial competition in China and the west are 
‘essentially the same’, as a purely functional approach might suggest, nor that they are 
‘entirely different phenomena’, as one focused on agency issues would conclude. In 
both contexts, the form, structure, biases and effects of territorial competition – 
conceived of broadly as a bottom-up activity advancing a set of locally-specific 
economic interests – can be seen to emerge, in an intelligible way, from the 
interaction of specific sets of structural and agency factors, rather than as conforming 
or not to a particular model.   
 
More specifically, we should make the point that there is no single ‘western’ model of 
territorial competition.  As has been noted elsewhere, European practice in this field 
still differs a lot from characteristic American models (such as the growth 
machine/regime).  And Chinese practice, though quite distinct from either, actually 
echoes in different ways both European and North American forms of territorial 
competition: the European in the way that ‘bottom-up’ activity turns out to be 
dependent on the central state’s leadership and direction; and the American in the 
proliferation of unintended and undesirable external effects. To put it simply, we 
might characterise different contexts for territorial competition in terms of two 
dimensions of the central state’s role: whether or not it promotes territorial 
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competition; and whether or not it regulates the activity (Figure 3). In these terms, the 
North American situation seems to represent the absence of either a promotional or 
regulatory role for the state.  Up to the 1970s, both Western Europe and China might 
be seen as having central states which regulated but did not promote bottom-up 
development activities.  Since then Europe seems to have moved to a position where 
states continue to regulate territorial competition, but now also promote it – whereas 
‘territorial competition, Chinese style’ is conditioned by a central state which 
promotes, but scarcely regulates, bottom-up activity. This lack of regulation is even 
more radical than in the American case, since it involves the absence of effective 
control over regional protectionism, as well as over financial bidding wars.  
 
[Figure 3 about here] 
The fact that ‘territorial competition, Chinese style’ is largely driven (in agency 
terms) by self-interested local officials chasing targets set, directly or indirectly, from 
Beijing does, however, offer the possibility of re-engineering the system so as to 
mitigate some of the more negative external effects. Thus, in principle at least, crude 
economic targets in terms of local GDP growth, FDI attraction and revenue 
generation could be replaced or complemented by indicators of social/environmental 
performance, or contributions to the development of wider regions. A suggestive 
example is that of Zhangjiang high-tech industrial park of Shanghai where policies 
have been switched since the 1990s from aggressive competitive bidding for FDI to a 
more selective attraction of business and university R&D facilities by a change in the 
indicators used to evaluate the leader’s performance. A broader redesign of the 
indicator system to ‘regulate’ the unsustainable aspects of Chinese territorial 
competition would depend both on central governmental commitment to wider goals, 
and the availability of robust measures of the relevant outcomes. All targeting systems 
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are likely to generate uinintended biases in policy, but it should be possible to channel 
the energies of careerist local leaders in directions which make ‘territorial 
competition, Chinese style’ more clearly positive-sum in its effects.  
 
A final observation which we should make is about the relationship between territorial 
competition and uneven development. A defining characteristic of such competition, 
unlike the top-down regional policies which held sway in Europe during the earlier 
post-war decades, is its indifference to concerns of spatial equity. Beyond that, there is 
a reasonable expectation that it will actually exacerbate spatial inequalities, since 
successful places should have more resources to apply to the activity, and may also 
reasonably see their stakes (in terms of possible gains/losses) as larger, thus justifying 
a stronger commitment of those resources to it (Cheshire and Gordon, 1996).  This 
seems to apply to the Chinese case. But there is one aspect of the nomenclature 
system which has a countervailing effect.  As we have seen, this now provides the 
major incentive element for development of active competition, with senior officials 
in sub-national authorities seeking advancement within a national framework of job 
allocations. Examination of the pattern of transfers on promotion suggests, however, 
that there is a characteristic tendency for such promotions to take officials from more 
to less economically advanced provinces or regions, hence prospectively diffusing 
experience and innovation down the hierarchy of local economic success (Chien 
2005).  In this single respect ‘territorial competition, Chinese style’ seems a bit less 
likely to promote uneven development than the American model (though it is playing 
with generally larger stakes) – if still more than in the European context where such 
competition is actually more muted, as well as more strongly regulated.   
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1
 We are grateful both to referees and  to participants in the Economic Geography of 
China session at the Association of American Geographers 2006 conference for 
comments on an earlier version of this paper, and also to Alan Harding for a helpfully 
edited version of Brenner’s (2006) EUREX ‘chat’.  
2
 At the most fundamental level, the structure/agency distinction involves issues about 
whether social institutions and norms (structures) are to be seen primarily as causes or 
effects of individuals’ choices and behaviours (agency).  In modern sociology, 
competing theories about causal primacy have, however, increasingly given way to 
more sophisticated accounts of characteristic ways in which macro-level structural 
factors interact with micro-level agency developments. It still the case, however, that 
hypotheses about the causes or effects of observed phenonema are most readily 
framed from within either a structure or an agency perspective. To escape the 
limitations of a one-eyed view, it is still appropriate then to self-consciously explore 
hypotheses framed from the other perspective, and examine how the two logics could 
be expected to interact (and do) in different types of context. 
3
 Lipietz (1987) characterises the (French) regulation school as ‘rebel sons’ both of 
Louis Althusser and of the technocrat planner Pierre Massé. 
4
  Or post-Socialist, as Wu (2003b) argues in his regulationist treatment  of the re-
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making of Shanghai as an entrepreneurial city. 
5
 Even seen from this perspective, neither the process nor its functionality are 
necessarily very neat. Brenner (2006) for example says that: 
 ‘all of the micro-level decisions and strategies that ensued post-1970s somehow 
seem to have congealed ... into a new regulatory (dis)order ...that no one 
intended ...but somehow embodies certain “rule regimes” that may be defended 
...by those who believe they represent the future of capitalism ’.  
However, in practice, as Jones and Ward (2002) observe: 
‘because regulationists appear to be preoccupied with mobilizing economic 
readings of crisis, ongoing developments within the extra-economic co-
ordinating or mediating mechanisms of capitalism are frequently ‘read off’ from 
changes in the economy.  Despite continual emphasis placed on contingency this 
can lead to an inherent danger of presenting institutional processes …. as 
functional to the needs of accumulation” (p.9).  
Though not strictly regulationist, Harvey’s (1989) analysis of urban 
entrepreneurial processes also moves between contingent and functionalist 
perspectives (cf. fn. 5), but with most readers/citers clearly presuming the latter.   
6
 In his careful analysis of many of these issues, Harvey (1989) noted that ‘to the 
degree that urban competition becomes more potent, it will almost certainly operate 
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as an “external coercive power” over individual cities to bring them into line with the 
discipline and logic of capitalist development’ (p. 10, emphasis added). While he goes 
on to suggest that a process of ‘leap-frogging’ competitive innovations is the 
inevitable outcome (p.12), we would emphasise that neither the potency nor the 
direction of urban competition can be taken for granted without consideration of 
agency issues.  Similarly, when he notes that a real revival of inter-urban (i.e. 
territorial) competition ‘required a radical reconstruction of central to local state 
relations and the cutting free of local state activities’ , we would suggest that – 
whatever the ‘evidence of turmoil in this quarter’  (p.15) – this reconstruction also 
cannot be taken for granted.     
7
 Harvey (1989) suggests that the trigger for a revival of boosterism in the US was a 
major cut-back in federal funding for urban governments by the Nixon administration 
from 1972 on.   
8
 Only falling short to the extent that its expected benefits from this move (and/or 
those of the firm) exceed those in the second highest bidder. 
9
 News source: ling dao jue ce xin xi (based in Beijing), 2004/April (no.15). 
10
 For example, while central policy provided for a 3-year tax-free period, followed by 
2 years at half rates, local governments might offer these terms for two 5-year periods, 
or even for two 10-year periods. News source: zhong kuo shi bao (based in Taipei), 
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2005/12/12; 2001/12/13 
11
 Wuxi airport of Jiangsu was converted from military use to provide easy acess to 
the global market, but has only six flights per day, as there are four others within 140 
kms, including the major Shanghai Hongqiao and Pudong airports. (News sources: 
zhong kuo shi bao (Taipei) 14.10.2002; zhong kuo shi bao (Taipei) 22.2.2003; South 
China Morning Post (Hong Kong) 13.4.2004. 
12
 This fragmentation of the national market is thus both cause and consequence of the 
particular form of territorial competition developed in the post-Mao China (see 
section 4-3, below). 
13
 Reinforced by a lack of consensus in Beijing about how fast market reforms should 
proceed (Lichtenstein 1991; Woo 1999; Fewsmith 2000).  
14
 According to the World Bank’s 2005 Investment Climate Survey. 
15
 At least until the wave of privatisations starting in 1997 (Poncet, 2005). 
16
 17 out of 30 listed the building materials industry as a key industry for their 
economies. The electronic industry, machinery industry and metallurgy industry were 
also targeted by 15 (Lu and Xue 1997). 
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          Table 1: FDI and trade from 1980 to 2004 (unit: US$ billion) 
 
 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 
Registered Foreign Capital n.a. 4.5 10.3 48.1 59.4 64.1 
Foreign capital as of GDP n.a. 1.5% 2.7% 7.0% 5.5% 3.9% 
Trade 38.1 69.6 115.4 208.9 474.3 1,154.9 
Trade as of GDP 12.6% 23% 30% 40% 44% 73% 
Source: China Statistics Yearbook (2005) 
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Figure 1 
Processes Shaping Territorial Competition (TC) 
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Figure 2: Asymmetric Decentralization in China 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure3 
 The Shifting role of the National state in Territorial competition: China,  
Western Europe and the USA 
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